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Abstract
We investigate the impact of the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on urban form
in an economy in which high- and low-income households choose between city and suburban
communities.   Because housing tax policies differentially affect the relative after-tax price of
housing for high- and low-income households, and because the extent of capitalization of
housing tax policies can differ across city and suburban communities, our analysis finds that
housing tax policies can affect not only the density of the metropolitan area but also can
influence where rich and poor households choose to live.
We also show that the impacts of housing tax policies differ depending on whether land
use constraints such as suburban large lot zoning exist.  If there are no land use constraints
present, increasing a subsidy to home ownership that is positively correlated with the income of
the owner tends to lead to the decentralization of both rich and poor, although there are
conditions under which the rich would choose to concentrate in the central city.  The ambiguity
of the effect on the choices of high income households suggests that impacts of the federal tax
treatment of housing may differ across metropolitan areas.  
In the presence of binding large lot zoning in the suburbs, the rich have a greater
incentive to decentralize while the poor are constrained to the city.  Thus, housing tax policy that
affects the relative price of land differentially for the rich and poor could have helped exacerbate
the intense residential sorting by income that we see in many parts of the United States. 
Importantly, our analysis of community choice is not driven by different preferences for city or
suburb that may be associated with the income elasticity of housing demand.  Rather, it results
from changes in relative after-tax housing prices faced by poor and rich households. 
Determining the empirical relevance of prices versus preferences in this matter should be an
urgent task for future research.1For example, in their widely cited review of the causes of suburbanization, Mieszkowski




This paper analyzes how current housing tax policy, which provides benefits to home
owners that increase with income, can influence urban form.   Mills (1987) and others have
shown that the favorable tax status of owner-occupied housing has resulted in more housing
investment than otherwise would have occurred.  We would expect that because land is an input
to housing, this increased housing investment would also result in lower population densities. 
With the exception of Blackley and Follain (1983), however, analyses of the patterns of
metropolitan development generally have not seriously considered the impact of the tax treatment
of housing.
1   In this paper, we focus on the differential impacts that the tax treatment of housing
can have on the consumption of land and on the location choices of high- versus low-income
households, and their associated consequences for urban form. 
There are two reasons why the tax treatment of housing can affect patterns of
metropolitan development beyond simply reducing density.  First, housing tax policies have
greater direct effects on the after-tax relative price of housing for high-income households and
therefore provide incentives with respect to housing and location choices that differ from the
incentives for low-income households.  Second, differing supply conditions across communities
are likely to yield different capitalization of housing-related tax incentives into market prices
across locations that also can influence after-tax relative prices.  For example, there should be a
different supply response, and hence different capitalization, in communities with limited
undeveloped land versus communities on the urban fringe that have plentiful supplies of open2
land.  In addition, the supply of housing available to high-income households will also depend on
the housing decisions of low-income residents so that the extent to which housing tax benefits
are capitalized into the market price of housing will depend on the geographic distribution of
high- and low-income households across communities.
These two features are incorporated in a model that we use to analyze the impact of
housing-related tax incentives on the housing consumption and community choices of high- and
low-income households that hold idiosyncratic preferences for cities (bounded, supply-
constrained communities) and suburbs (unbounded, supply-unconstrained communities).   A key
feature of our analysis of community choice is that households’ choices are not driven by
different preferences between high-and low-income households but by the effects of policy on
after-tax housing prices.  The impact of the tax treatment of housing is examined under two
regimes: one with no land-market constraints and one with a binding large lot zoning
requirement in the suburbs.
When no binding zoning rules exist so that rich and poor households are equally mobile
within the metropolitan area, our results indicate that a policy lowering the relative price of
housing for high-income households unambiguously creates an incentive for low-income
residents to leave the city and, under most circumstances, induces more high-income households
to choose suburban locations as well.  There are conditions, however, under which the tax policy
would provide an incentive for high-income households to locate in the central city.  This
ambiguity in the impact on the community choices of high-income households suggests that the
impacts of the federal tax treatment of housing may not be uniform across metropolitan areas. 
The conditions under which the policy creates an incentive for high-income households to locate3
in the city are, however, likely to be uncommon, so the net effect most probably is an increased
decentralization of both high- and low-income households with an increase in total land
consumption.  
In the presence of a binding suburban zoning constraint that limits the ability of the poor
to purchase a lot in the suburbs, tax policy that subsidizes the rich increases the degree of spatial
sorting by income in the metropolitan area.  More specifically, if large lot zoning in the suburbs
confines poorer households to the central city, then a proportional subsidy that reduces the
relative price of housing for high-income households will, under most circumstances, result in
greater decentralization of the rich and hence a greater separation of high- and low-income
households than otherwise would occur.  Thus, it is only in the presence of a binding large lot
zoning constraint that a proportional subsidy to owners can generate residential sorting by
income of the type we see in the United States.
The practical relevance of these theoretical conclusions derives partially from their
implication that policy influencing the spatial pattern of relative land prices, not just preferences
for lower density lifestyles combined with rising incomes and better transportation systems, may
have helped shape urban form in the U.S.  In addition, our findings have potentially important
implications for the emerging debate surrounding smart growth initiatives.  If enacted, some of
those initiatives clearly will affect the relative price of land across communities within individual
metropolitan areas.  The conclusions of our model suggest that the spatial pattern of development
and the degree of residential sorting by income can be influenced by policies affecting relative
land prices across space.2The Statistics of Income Bulletin (Internal Revenue Service, Washington D.C.: Fall
1995) reports that 23.2 percent of all filers used the mortgage interest deduction.  Although the
IRS does not tabulate data separately for owners and renters, if we assume that 65 percent of all
filers are home owners, then the fact that 23.2 percent of all filers use the mortgage interest
deduction suggests that roughly 36 percent of all owners use the standard deduction.
3That this is, indeed, a relatively high income is evident from the fact that the median
household income in 1998 was $33,400 (in 1998 dollars; 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances).
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2. THE MAGNITUDE AND DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
ASSOCIATED WITH OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING
On an annual basis, tax expenditures associated with mortgage interest and local property
tax deductions are very large.   Auten and Reschovsky (1998) report that the Department of the
Treasury estimates the value of the mortgage interest deduction alone to be $53.7 billion and the
property tax deduction to be $18.4 billion, for a total of $72.1 billion in fiscal year 1999.  Auten
and Reschovsky (1998) also note that the subsidy to home ownership from the nontaxation of
imputed rent amounts to about $100 billion. 
The benefits of mortgage interest and property tax deductions, as well as the nontaxation
of imputed rent, do not accrue equally to all owners.  In fact, less than one quarter of all filers and
less than 40 percent of all home owners have sufficient income, house value, and leverage to
warrant itemizing in lieu of taking the standard deduction.
2  For the predominantly low- and
moderate-income owners that do not itemize, there are no benefits related to mortgage interest or
local property tax deductions.  Cecchetti and Rupert (1996) report that over 70 percent of the tax
expenditures associated with the mortgage interest deduction accrue to households with annual
earnings in excess of $75,000.
3  Thus, the mortgage and property tax deductions result in high-
and low-income households’ facing different after-tax prices for housing.
Even though all home owners profit from the nontaxation of imputed rent, this aspect of5
the housing subsidy also is differentially valued by high-and low-income households.  Because
high-income households face higher marginal tax rates, the nontaxation of imputed rents
effectively lowers the after-tax price of housing more for high-income households than for low-
income households.  For example, Poterba (1991) estimates that tax code-related benefits to
owner-occupied housing lower the costs of high-tax-bracket owners by as much as 15 percent.  
Thus, the net impact of the tax treatment of housing is to provide greater benefits for
households with greater income and wealth.  The remainder of the paper examines how this can
affect the density and residential makeup of a metropolitan area. 
   3.  A MODEL OF THE IMPACTS OF RELATIVE HOUSE PRICE CHANGES IN A
METROPOLITAN AREA WITH BOUNDED AND UNBOUNDED COMMUNITIES
The structure of our model is characterized by the following features: (a) a metropolitan 
area in which there is a city with a fixed boundary and a suburban community that always can
expand on the margin; (b) two types of workers, high and low skill/income; (c) a housing subsidy
that only high-skill households receive; and (d) a system of preferences in which households of a
given type have identical preferences over housing services and nonhousing services, but can
differ in terms of an idiosyncratic preference for city versus suburban location.  The remainder of
this section discusses these features and their implications in more detail.
3.1 Characterization of the Metropolitan Area
There is a single metropolitan area consisting of two jurisdictions indexed by  j = (c,s),
with c denoting the central city and s denoting the suburban jurisdiction.  The central city
boundary is exogenously given and cannot be changed so that the central city’s land area, L c, is
fixed.  We refer to the central city as being a bounded community with its land in perfectly4While the central city is always the bounded community and the suburb the unbounded
community in our lexicon, the results derived below generally apply to communities with low
versus high supply elasticities. 
5We assume that the metropolitan area is an integrated labor market and that all locations
are equally accessible to employment so that there are no commuting-related rent or wage
gradients.
6
inelastic supply.  In contrast, unimproved land in the suburban region, Ls, is assumed to be
perfectly elastically supplied.  Hence, the suburbs are the unbounded community.
4  Because there
is a potentially infinite supply of land to the suburban community, its price, rs, is fixed at the
value of its alternative use–agriculture.  City land price, rc, adjusts to allocate the scarce resource,
city land.
In addition, two types of workers indexed by i=(h,l), with h denoting high skill and l
denoting low skill, live in the metropolitan area.  Each group is fixed in size, N
i, with high-skill
workers earning wage w
h and low-skill workers earning wage w
l.
5  The distribution of these two
groups across the metropolitan area depends on systematic and idiosyncratic preferences,
equilibrium prices, and housing subsidies.
3.2 Characterization of the Housing Subsidy
The various tax code-related benefits to owner occupancy can lower the after-tax price of
owner-occupied housing.  Abstracting from the nontaxation of imputed rent, we specify the
mortgage interest and property tax deductions as a subsidy, 
i, defined as the fraction of the price
of housing services paid by the government.  For simplicity, we assume that the level of the
standard deduction and the progressivity of the tax code combine to function so that the mortgage6Thus, we effectively assume that low-skill worker households do not itemize. 
Depending on the extent of capitalization, the tax advantages of mortgage and property tax
deductions affect the after-tax price of housing while the tax benefits associated with the standard
deduction do not affect the relative price of housing.
7
interest and property tax deductions are attractive only to high-skill workers.
6  
For low-skill, low-income households, 
l=0, so that the after-tax price of housing services
(rj
l
a) equals the observed market price of those services, rj.  Because the after-tax price equals the
market price for low income households, we drop the superscript on after-tax rents for the
remainder of the discussion.  For high-skill, high-income households, the after-tax price of
housing services is given by equations (1) and (2), 
rja  =  (1- 
h)rj    where 0 < 
h < 1,   j =c,s. (1), (2)
Note that the after-tax price of housing for high-income individuals depends not only on the
direct effect of  , but also on the effect of   on equilibrium prices.  At one extreme,   could be
perfectly capitalized into market prices such that after-tax prices were unchanged by the subsidy;
at the other extreme, there could be no capitalization and rj would be unaffected by   while  rja
would fall by the full amount of  .
3.3 Preferences
Individuals consume a market good, X (whose price is the numeraire), and housing
services, Hj.  An individual consumer, k,  maximizes utility by choosing residential location and
optimal quantities of X and Hj given rj, 
i, and w
i.  More formally,
Max U
ik ( X, Hj )   Subject to:   X + (1-
i)rj Hj = w
i.        (3)
Individuals of a given type are assumed to have identical preferences over X, and Hj, but they7Because suburban rent is fixed at the value of its alternative use, city rents are always
greater than or equal to suburban rents.  Thus, the systematic component of utility in the city is
always less than or equal to the systematic component of suburban utility.  Therefore, households
choosing to live in the city must have a preference for the city, and hence 
i*  0.
8
differ in their preferences for city or suburban location.   The utility function is defined such that
the indirect utility function, V
ik, takes the following form
High skill: V





                   (4)
Low skill: V






where V(.)  is the systematic component of utility and  j
ik is the increment to indirect utility
associated with the choice of location j.  Note that  j
ik is normalized such that it represents the
incremental utility associated with an individual choosing a suburban location.  Specifically, let 
ik =    c
ik -  s
ik define the relative idiosyncratic preference for locations c and s.
3.4 Location Choice 
Because all consumers have identical tastes except for idiosyncratic preferences for city




i*  =  V
i
c  -  V
i
s .
More formally, for each worker type the marginal consumer is defined such that
h* = V(rca, w
h ) - V(rsa, w
h
 )                                 (5)
l*  = V(rc, w
l
  )  - V(rs, w
l
 ).                       (6)
Since rc  rs, 
i*  0 or no households would choose to live in the city.
7
By specifying a distribution, 
i, for 
ik, the number of rich or poor households choosing8Note that increasing wealth is assumed not to change one’s intrinsic preference for a city
versus suburban location.  Thus, when subsidies increase, they do not favor city or suburbs. 
Similarly, w
i does not affect the population distribution because wages for individuals of a given




i, can be determined as a function of relative rents in the city and suburbs.
8 
Thus, the numbers of rich and poor households choosing to live in the city are given by:
Nc
i =  
i(
i*), for i = h, l.             (7), (8)
It is straightforward that  /
i* > 0.  For example, if indifference requires a very negative 
i* ,
few people will choose a city residence.  Essentially, city rents are relatively high if 
i* is strongly
negative.  However, as 
i*  increases toward zero, the number of people choosing city residences
increases.  Hence, the derivative must be positive.




i ,      i = h, l.                         (9), (10)
3.5 Housing Demand
Given an indirect utility function, Roy’s identity provides the demand for housing by each
individual household.  Conditional on the choice of jurisdiction, individual housing demand is a
function of rja, and w
h  for high-skill households and rj, and w




j =  H
h( rja, w
h ),    for j=c,s;         (11), (12)
H
l
j  =  H
l (rj ,  w
l ),     for j=c,s         (13), (14)9This does imply that, when population falls in the city, the remaining city residents
consume more city housing services.  Implicitly, we are assuming that the housing stock adjusts
in terms of size of housing to match demand.  This also is unrealistic in the short run, as housing
that does not match consumer demands often is left vacant.  It is noteworthy that this sort of
fixity of city housing stock only reinforces the results below associated with sorting by income.
10
3.6 Aggregate Demand and Supply of Land
Land consumption is assumed to be proportional to the demand for housing services. 
Assuming purely for convenience that the proportionality factor equals one, land consumption,
which cannot exceed L c in the city, is given by




l.      (15)
Suburban land, which is not exogenously given, is defined by 




l.      (16)
While the assumption of proportionality is a useful one because it simplifies the algebra in the
comparative static analysis below by doing away with the need to explicitly model the production
of housing with capital and land, it obviously is not realistic.  Hence, its potential impact on the
results needs to be examined up front.  Clearly, if land prices were to increase, capital could be
substituted for land in the production of housing services.  That is, more people could be
accommodated in the rising land price area by increasing the use of capital (i.e., by building up). 
By assuming proportionality, we abstract from this margin for substitution.  However, all our key
comparative statics results hold as long as there are diminishing returns to using capital in the
production of housing.  Because land is a fixed factor in the city, the unit cost of housing will rise
with an increasing number of households in the city, even as capital is substituted for land.  Rents
in the city still adjust to allocate the scarce resource.
9  This  highlights that the bounded-
unbounded distinction between communities in the metropolitan area is much more important to11
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the model than is our simplified housing supply side.  
4.  COMPARATIVE STATICS
4.1 Case 1:  No Lot Size Constraints
The first case considered is one in which no land use constraints of any type are present. 
With w
i exogenously fixed, equations (1), (2), (5)-(16) form a system of 14 equations (six of










l, and Ls.  Note
that rs does not adjust in this case because agricultural land is perfectly elastically supplied.
To examine the effects of changing the mortgage interest and local property tax
deductions on location choices and housing consumption by high- and low-skill workers, these
equations can be totally differentiated as follows:
                                                              
(17)
                                                    (18)
      
          (19) 
                                                                                         (20)
                                                                                   (21)
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Consider the effects of a change in subsidies on the price of housing services in the city,
which is given by:
(31)
In the denominator, the first and third terms are negative because the demand for housing by each
skill type falls as price increases (i.e., V
h/rca<0 and V
l/rc<0) and because the number of people
choosing city residences increases with 
h* (i.e., 
h/
h>0).   The second and fourth terms are also
negative because housing demand decreases as after-tax rents increase (i.e., Hc
l/rc<0 and
Hc
h/rca<0).  Thus, the denominator clearly is negative.  
Signing the numerator requires a bit  more analysis.  The second term of the numerator is
always negative because demand curves slope down.  However, the sign of the first term depends
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degree zero (which is the case for the indirect utility function), it is straightforward to show that 
 so that equation (31) can be rewritten as: ()
()



































































0             (31’)
The numerator now clearly is negative, making the derivative unambiguously positive.  While
algebraically cumbersome, this is not surprising economically, since an increase in housing
subsidies increases the overall demand for housing.  This, in turn, increases city prices because
housing in this part of the metropolitan area is inelastically supplied. 
Equations (31) and (31’) basically show the extent to which tax subsidies for housing are
capitalized into market prices.  Two aspects of these equations warrant further discussion.  First,
the degree of capitalization will be lower when there are larger numbers of low-income
households living in the city.  It will also be lower if these households’ city housing consumption
is highly sensitive to price.  To see this more clearly, note that the last two terms in the
denominator represent the responses of low-income households to changes in prices, and the
larger these terms are, the less capitalization of subsidies into market prices there is.  The
economic intuition for this result is simply that low-income residents are the suppliers of land to
the high-income households receiving the subsidies.  And the more elastic that supply, the lower
the capitalization of the subsidies to the rich owners.  
Second,  housing subsidies are never completely capitalized into market prices even if
there are no low-income households in the city in which land supply is fixed.  Incomplete
capitalization arises from the fact that high-income households can opt for a suburban residence
where subsidies always lower after-tax market prices (because housing there is in perfectly elastic
supply). This can be seen more formally by noting that complete capitalization would leave after-15
tax prices unchanged so that drca/d   = (1- )drc/d   -  rc = 0, or drc/d  = rc /(1- ).   Manipulation of
(31) reveals that drc/d  < rc /(1- ) even when there are no low-income households in the city.  
These findings with respect to capitalization will be important for our analysis below of the
impact of housing subsidies on the community choices of high- and low-income households. 
4.1.2 Number of Households Choosing City Residences
Increases in subsidies always reduce the number of low-income households choosing to
live in the city as is evident by
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As subsidies rise, rents in the city increase, so fewer low-income households, which pay the full
market price, choose to live in the city.
The situation is more ambiguous for high-income people.  The effect of subsidies on the
number of high-income people choosing city residences is given by:
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or rewritten in slightly different form,

























This comparative static result cannot be signed unambiguously.   The first term within the
parenthesis of equation (33’) is always negative while the second term is greater than or equal to10Note that drc/d  > 0 even when 
h* = 0.
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zero (when the fact that it is being subtracted is considered).  Economically, the change in the
number of high-income households living in the city depends on how the utility differential
responds to the change in after-tax rents in the city and suburb.
Still, some useful first inferences about the effects of changing subsidies on the
community choices of high-income households can be made by considering alternative values of
h*.  First, suppose 
h* = 0, which is its maximum value and implies that city and suburban rents
are identical.  Increasing subsidies would unambiguously increase rents and, because the second
term of (32’) vanishes, reduce the number of rich households choosing city residences.
10  Second,
even as 
h*  becomes increasingly negative (and rc increases relative to rs), there is a range in which
dNc
h/d  still is negative because dNc


















larger than first may appear because as 
h* becomes more negative, drc/d  becomes increasingly
positive to at least partially offset the effect of 
h*.   
The two competing factors determining which effect dominates are as follows:  (a) the
extent to which housing subsidies are capitalized into city rents, with substantial capitalization
tending to reduce the incentive for high-income households to locate in the city because after-tax
house prices do not fall by as much in this case;  and (b) the size of the city-suburban after-tax
rent differential (which also is reflected in the size of 
h*, as it measures the intensity of preference
for city living necessary to maintain a wide rent differential); a larger differential increases the
incentive for high-income households to live in the city.  11This can be seen by setting the Hc
l and Nc
l = 0 in equation (31) and substituting drc/d




































Although it is not possible to evaluate mathematically which effect dominates without
additional structure on the model, further examination can shed some light on the issue.  First,
consider the impact of capitalization.  Because the city is bounded, if only high-income people
lived in the city, increases in subsidies would be capitalized into rents such that aggregate land
consumption remains unchanged.  The subsidy also would be fully capitalized if there were only
one community with a fixed, fully utilized supply of land, with market rents increasing to
completely offset the subsidy.  In our framework, however, households can choose to move to the
suburbs where land is elastically supplied.  Because suburban after-tax rents must fall with an
increase in subsidy, some high-income households will be attracted to the suburbs on the margin. 
This implies that if only high-income households live in the city, dNc
h /d  <0.
11   Equilibrium
requires that all land in the city be used so that after-tax city rent must fall with an increase in
subsidies, thereby confirming that housing subsidies cannot be completely capitalized into rent
even though the city’s boundary is fixed.  
If both high- and low-income households live in the city, the impact of subsidies on the
location choice of high-income households is more complex because the supply of city land for
high-income households can increase by bidding it away from low-income households.  Since
subsidies unambiguously increase the market price in the city, low-income residents adjust by
lowering housing consumption and choosing suburban locations.  Thus, the supply of land
available for high-income households increases when subsidies increase.  The extent to which city18
land is elastically supplied to high- income households will depend on the extent of land holdings
by low-income households in the city and the sensitivity of city land consumption by low-income
land holders to changes in the price of land.  This sensitivity is a function of both the elasticity of
community choice with respect to price and the elasticity of housing demand with respect to price,
given a community choice.  High-income households are more likely to choose city residences if
there is a very large reduction in low-income consumption of city housing in response to an
increase in price.    Highly price elastic responses by low-income households limit the extent to
which the subsidy is capitalized, which in turn results in a larger reduction of after-tax rent for
high-income households.
Limited capitalization alone, however, does not guarantee that dNc
h /d  >0.  As was shown
earlier, when there is little difference in city and suburban rents, increasing subsidies result in
fewer high-income people choosing city residences.   For dNc
h /d  >0, there must also be a large
enough differential between rc and rs so that the proportional subsidy has a sufficiently large
absolute impact on after-tax rents in the city and, hence, provides an incentive for high-income
households to locate in the city.  Of course, the extent by which rc exceeds rs and the extent of
capitalization often are not unrelated.  Generally, we would expect greater capitalization in areas
with large rent differentials because the high relative rent presumably reflects some fixity to land
supply, and capitalization should be more complete, the more inelastic the effective supply of land
to the rich.
It would take rather unusual preferences for there to be both low capitalization of the
subsidy and a large city-suburban rent differential.  In particular, it would require the distribution
of idiosyncratic  preferences among low-income households to be such that a larger number of12Adding more housing by building up (i.e., increasing density) also would make for a
more elastic effective supply limiting capitalization, and, thereby, narrowing the range over
which the rich will wish to choose the suburbs.  This is an empirical issue that suggests that the
ease with which density can be increased could affect observed behavior across metropolitan
areas.  As noted above, the theoretical results hold as long as there are diminishing returns to the
fixed factor in the model.
19
low-income households would choose city residences despite relatively high prices, yet these
same households would have to adjust their consumption of city housing (either by moving or
lowering housing consumption) significantly in response to changes in price.  One case that might
generate such behavior is an area with a large immigrant population that, for networking and
language reasons, is willing to pay a premium to live in the central city.  Marginal adjustments to
housing consumption by a large number of these immigrant households could keep housing
supply to the rich elastic enough that capitalization of the subsidy is relatively low so that
increases in the subsidy result in lower after-tax rents for the rich and an increase in demand for
city residences by these high-income households.
12
In sum, the impact of the subsidy on the spatial distribution of high-income households
could differ by metropolitan area.  For regions in which city rents are not high relative to suburban
rents, we would expect an increase in the subsidy to foster decentralization of the rich.  For
regions in which land costs are very high in the city, this need not be the case.  However, even in
these areas, the rich are more likely to decentralize the greater the extent to which the subsidy is
capitalized into city prices.  In general, it seems that the cases in which there are both large
differentials in city and suburban rents and low capitalization would be rare.  20
4.1.3 Household Land Consumption
Household land consumption depends on the after-tax rent for high-income households
and market rents for low-income households.  For high-income households, the effect of subsidies
on city land consumption is given by












As discussed in section 4.1.1, the subsidy cannot be fully capitalized, so subsidies must lower
after-tax rents in the city for high-income households.  Thus, housing consumption by high-
income households rises with an increase in subsidy.  
In the suburbs, because land is elastically supplied, there is no capitalization and, as is
evident from equation (20), drsa / d  = - rs < 0.  Thus,












Increased subsidies lower after-tax suburban prices and increase suburban land consumption by
high-income households.
Since low-income households do not receive any subsidy and market rents in the city
increase with subsidies, increased subsidies must reduce low-income households’ land
consumption in the city as shown in equation (36):











=< 013We assume that there are at least enough households that wish to live in the city at rents
equal to their alternative use (rs) to occupy all available city land.                                                     
        
14The ambiguity here derives from the fact that the proportional subsidy reduces the
relative price of housing more in absolute terms in areas where the rent is higher.  Thus, there are
potentially (but as we have argued, unlikely) circumstances in which the subsidy could make the
bounded community more attractive if it has a significantly large downward impact on the after-
tax price of housing in that community.  This result is in the spirit of Blackely and Follain
(1983), who, in a monocentric city context, argue that it is possible for the tax treatment of

























Finally, because subsidies do not affect suburban market rents, dHs
l / d  = 0.
4.1.4 Aggregate Land Consumption
Aggregate land consumption in the city is fixed at L c and, therefore, is unaffected by
subsidies.
13  The effects of subsidies on the amount of suburban land consumed is given by
      (37)
The sign of equation (37) is ambiguous in general.
14  However, if the number of high-income
households living in the suburbs increases with subsidies, then total land consumption in the
suburbs increases with an increase in subsidy.
4.1.5 Summary
With no constraints in the land market, introducing a subsidy to ownership that is
positively correlated with income has the following impacts.  First, it unambiguously increases
market rents in the city.  Second, low-income households that do not benefit from the housing
subsidy program and therefore confront higher market rents in the city have an incentive to
decentralize to the suburbs.  Third, the implication for the location choice of high-income
households is ambiguous.  Upon closer examination, however, it appears that in most22
circumstances the tax subsidy will result in greater numbers of high-income households’ also
choosing suburban locations.  In particular, decentralization of richer households is likely in
metropolitan areas with the following traits: (a) city rents are not especially high relative to those
in the suburbs; and/or ( b) capitalization of the subsidy into land prices is extensive.  Only in areas
with relatively high rents in the city and in which the subsidy is not capitalized would we expect
the rich to have a greater incentive to locate in the city.  Thus, with no constraints in the land
market, it does not appear likely that the subsidy will generate residential sorting by income in this
model.  If it did, it would leave the rich concentrated in the city, not the suburbs.  
If decentralization of the rich does occur, aggregate land consumption in the suburbs
increases unambiguously.  On a per household basis, an increase in the subsidy clearly leads a rich
household to consume more land in the city and the suburbs.  For the typical low-skill household,
land consumption clearly falls in the city and is unchanged in the suburbs.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that the impacts described by this model are symmetric.  If low-
income households rather than high income households received the subsidy, low income-
households’ choices would be affected in the same way that high-income households would be if
they received the subsidy.  That is, if a special tax credit were instituted that was available only to
low-income households, high income households unambiguously would have an incentive to
suburbanize, and low-income households would, in most circumstances, have an incentive to
suburbanize as well.  In our model, it is the effect of the subsidy on the relative price of housing
that drives behavior, not the incomes of the owners per se.  15The model would generate the same qualitative results with a weaker assumption.  The







































































4.2 Case 2:  Lot Size Constraints
The second case introduces a common suburban land use restriction in the form of a
minimum lot size requirement for residential development.  To help simplify the analysis, it is
assumed that lot size constraints exist such that no low-skill people choose to live in the suburbs,
but the constraints are not binding for high-skill workers.
15  In other words, high-skill workers
earn sufficiently high wages that they always choose lots at least as large as the constraint
whenever they choose a suburban site.  Low-skill workers, on the other hand, have sufficiently
low wages that they never choose to purchase a lot as large as the minimum in the suburbs.
These simplifying assumptions imply the following modifications to the comparative
statics analyzed in Case 1.  Equation (22) is no longer relevant, since low-skill workers never
choose to live in the suburbs, and equations (38) and (39) simplify to
    (38)
 (39)
The new comparative static result for city rents is given in equation (40):  
              (40)24
Equation (40) is the same as (31’) except that it does not include the term representing low-income
households’ community choice response to a change in city prices.  Although it is not possible to
directly compare the magnitudes of the rent impact under the two cases because they represent
different equilibria, one might be tempted to say that the effect on rents would be greater in the
constrained case because low-income households cannot move away from the city and, hence,
have only one margin on which to adjust their consumption of city land.  This would imply that
land would be less elastically supplied to high-income households that received the increased
subsidy, and hence, a greater share of the subsidy would be capitalized.  This is not the complete
story, however, because there also may be more low-income households in the city. 
Consequently, the aggregate response of households lowering housing demand in response to
increasing market prices could exceed the aggregate response in the unconstrained case in which
low-income households can adjust both by moving and by reducing housing consumption.   
That said, given an existing set of land use restrictions and a corresponding distribution of
low-income households, increasing subsidies would result in greater capitalization of the subsidy
than would occur conditional on the same distribution of low-income households whose future
mobility was unconstrained.  Subsidy changes generally take place in the context of land use
policies that are long-standing, rather than in the context of shifting from constrained to
unconstrained regimes.  Therefore, empirically one would expect to see greater capitalization of
subsidy changes in areas in which land use policies restrict the mobility of low-income
households.  Recall from above that greater capitalization implies a higher likelihood that subsidy
increases result in fewer high-income households choosing city residences.  Further following the
logic outlined in the previous section, subsidies to higher income people such as those arising25
from the mortgage-interest deduction are more likely to foster the separation of the rich into
suburban neighborhoods and poor in city neighborhoods when a land use constraint such as
binding large lot zoning exists. 
5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our analysis has shown that a public policy subsidizing home ownership differentially
along income lines can affect the density of the metropolitan area, as well as influence where rich
and poor households choose to live.   We have shown that these impacts need not be uniform
across metropolitan areas and that the impacts also depend importantly on whether binding land
use constraints exist.  If none are present, increasing the subsidy definitely leads to
decentralization of the poor and probably to the decentralization of the rich.  However, there are
cases in which the rich would disproportionately choose to live in the city.  Such cases can arise
when the following two conditions obtain:  (a) there are strong idiosyncratic preferences for city
life among the low-income residents that can sustain large differentials in city and suburban rents;
and (b) aggregate reductions in city land consumption by low-income households in response to
market price increases are sufficiently large to prevent significant capitalization of the subsidy. 
We view this combination of circumstances as relatively unlikely.  Consequently, in the absence
of land market constraints, tax code-related benefits to home ownership probably lead to the
decentralization of both the rich and the poor and, further, seem unlikely to be able to account for
the intense residential sorting by income that we see in most metropolitan areas in the United
States.  
The implications for residential sorting, however, are different when a constraint such as
large lot suburban zoning exists.  Because city rents tend to increase more with the subsidy in this26
case, the rich will tend to have a greater incentive to locate in the suburbs.  With the poor stuck in
the city because of the large lot zoning limitations, residential sorting by income is likely to be
greater because of the subsidy policy as long as there is some elasticity to the demand curve for
residential land.  
Determining the empirical relevance of this case should be an important issue for future
research, as it suggests that policy, not just preferences for less density, may have played a role in
shaping America’s urban form.  Pinning down the influence that price and preference have had
not only would be interesting in its own right but certainly would help inform the current debate
surrounding urban sprawl and its costs and benefits.  Careful measurement of the subsidies
themselves, along with estimates of demand elasticities, are needed to determine if policy could
have influenced our urban form in a meaningful way.  Another useful extension of the model
would be to incorporate local amenities that are at least partially determined by the makeup of the
local population.  Endogenous local amenities could affect prices in a way that encourages sorting
by income even more than in our second model.  However, we leave that work for the future.27
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